Wednesday, June 11, 2014

MO Transpo Tax Part 3: What's Its Chance?

Part 3 of 3; part 2 is here; part 1 is here.

Yesterday, the pro-Amendment 7 campaign committee, Missourians for Safe Transportation and New Jobs, received donations totaling $97,500. That's yesterday alone. Since the committee's inception, it's raised $586,022. According to Scott Cannon of the Kansas City Star, financial support of the pro-Amendment 7 effort is expected to total "upward of $5 million."

Meanwhile, the anti-Amendment 7 campaign committee, Missourians for Better Transportation Solutions, "likely will rely on social media and public events."

The pro-Amendment 7 committee has Normington & Petts, a DC-based polling and strategy firm with a load of experience winning tough races. It also has valuable experience in statewide Missouri campaigns, as it polled and consulted for Jay Nixon's victorious 2008 campaign for governor.

That's not to say that the dramatic resource disparity of the pro- and anti-7 campaigns automatically makes passage a slam dunk. Conventional Missouri political wisdom holds that Missouri's August primary electorate has a generally anti-tax disposition. Nevertheless, the dramatic resource disparity very well could "level the playing field," if not tilt the playing field in the pro-7 forces' favor.

And a "level playing field" very well could be sufficient to pass Amendment 7. The pro-7 forces need for success but a bare majority: 50% of Missouri's August 5th voters plus one.

And that's the St. Louis regional transportation policy dice-roll. St. Louis' multi-modal transportation advocates have decided to put their public organization efforts seemingly entirely into defeating Amendment 7 on August 5th rather than recently-and-now organizing public pressure on the County Executive's Office for a more multi-modal County project list. St. Louis' multi-modal transportation advocates should hope that they've correctly assessed the potential outcomes and have strategized accordingly. The stakes in this dice-roll are the next ten years (at least) of St. Louis regional transportation policy.

Tuesday, June 10, 2014

MO Transpo Tax Part 2: Sales Tax in the City (and County)

Part 2 of 3; Part 1 is here.

While a sales tax may be less regressive than a fuel tax in rural Missouri, a sales tax is still regressive in rural Missouri. In urban and inner-ring suburban St. Louis, the opposite relationship tends to occur. A sales tax is more regressive than a fuel tax in urban/inner-ring suburban St. Louis (though a fuel tax would be regressive, too).

For Missouri communities more urban in character, state sales tax revenue can do things that fuel tax revenue cannot. Missouri gasoline/diesel taxes can only be used for roads, per Article IV Section 30(a) of the Missouri Constitution. Missouri sales tax revenue isn't limited as such, and can be used for any kind of transportation infrastructure such as mass transit, bicycle, pedestrian, river, air, etc. In the Mayor's words, state sales tax revenue provides for flexibility:


Room 200's list of projects submitted to MoDOT takes large advantage of the flexibility afforded by sales tax revenue as opposed to gasoline/diesel tax revenue. Only 25% of the City's "90%" category allotment of revenue ($255 million) would go to road and bridge projects. The other 75% (of $255 million) would go to Complete Streets projects, transit projects, bicyle/pedestrian path projects, airport projects, river port projects and a law enforcement "total transportation center." The City of St. Louis is further projected to receive an additional $2.5 million per year in discretionary, flexible transportation funds. 

In St. Louis County, it's a different story.

After a issuing a statement that the Missouri transportation sales tax issue is "not a top priority" for his administration, the County Executive (at least figuratively) mailed it in to MoDOT. Alex Ihnen's nextSTL piece estimates that approximately 98% of the County's "90%" category allotment of revenue ($841 million) would go to road and bridge projects. It's almost as if the County's "90%" category allotment might as well be gasoline/diesel tax revenue.

Obscured in the story so far has been the fact that these "90%" category county project lists are not final until approved by the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission upon presentation by MoDOT's district heads. There was and is still both time and opportunity for a more multi-modal set of projects for St. Louis County.
 

It appears to me here that City Aldermanic President Reed refers to the County Executive Office's current ability to revise and/or amend the County project list:   
It's anyone's guess as to what, if any, revisions or amendments the County Executive's Office will make to the County list. What's apparent is the lack of an effort to organize public pressure on the County Executive's Office to take a more multi-modal transportation approach that would be in line with the Mayor's Office's approach.

Instead, efforts at organizing the public for "better transportation solutions" are going toward a campaign to mobilize votes against the state-wide measure, 56 days from now, on August 5th.

Friday, June 6, 2014

MO Transpo Tax Part 1: Rural Road Politics

MSR "farm-to-market" road in Nodaway County, Missouri (2012)
Part 1 of 3

In order to understand the politics of the proposed Missouri 10-year transportation 0.75% sales tax (Amendment 7), start at the Missouri Supplemental Route. This is the MoDOT-maintained system of single and double-lettered roads (i.e. "A" or "BB") that you drive on mostly in rural Missouri. The MSR system of roads is "within 2 miles of more than 95% of all [rural Missouri] farm houses, schools, churches, cemeteries and stores." Many-to-most of the roads in the MSR system could be called "farm-to-market" roads.

Since 2011 when, due to budget cuts, MoDOT commenced its "5 year plan" of cuts of maintenance facilities and workers, the MSR system roads have degraded and continue to degrade. (Ask anybody who uses the MSR system in rural Missouri, and they'll confirm it. I've noticed it.) Depending on who you believe, the degradation of the MSR road system is either the natural result of MoDOT's dramatically-reduced budget, capital and labor capacity ... or a manufactured crisis in service of "Big Concrete." (Consider me insufficiently informed as to causation and therefore agnostic.)

Manufactured or not, it's pretty bad right now (and appearing only to get worse) for communities that depend on the MSR system. At the same time, the communities that the MSR system serve are communities where a fuel tax would hit much harder economically than would a sales tax. By communities, I mean to include not only ordinary people but also the agricultural & ranching industry.

Both this time and the last time (when the transportation sales tax measure failed to move out of the legislature and onto the ballot), rural-based interests (i.e. Missouri Farm Bureau) and rural-based legislators (i.e. Hinson in the House and Kehoe in the Senate) have initiated the drive for a transportation sales tax. Any tax is tough, but a sales tax is least tough on rural Missouri's people and industry when a fuel tax is the alternative. It's both a pocketbook issue and a bottom line issue.

And the MSR roads are bad and getting worse ...   

Wednesday, April 30, 2014

Would Participatory Budgeting Boost Anemic Voter Turnout in the City of St. Louis?

Many City of St. Louis politicians talk a good game while other politicians, much more quietly, make good things happen. For so many of the talkers, the default explanation for why their ideas don't get implemented is that St. Louis City's government and politics are fractured into fiefdoms that are controlled by hard-headed pols. Of course, this default explanation never seems to apply to those pols who tender it.

In the 2013 race for Alderman of the City's 6th Ward, Christine Ingrassia soundly defeated Michelle Witthaus by a 2-1 margin. After such a sound victory, Ingrassia could have taken-on Conan the Barbarian's philosophy. But she didn't. Instead, Ingrassia immediately reached-out to Witthaus in order to collaborate on what was largely the raison d'ĂȘtre of Witthaus' aldermanic campaign: participatory budgeting in the 6th Ward.

The collaboration between two former rivals, one electoral victor and one electoral defeated (and don't forget dozens of volunteers and the community at large), has proven to be soundly successful. The 6th Ward's experience with participatory budgeting is especially encouraging because of the 6th Ward's socioeconomic diversity. For a City of St. Louis increasingly segregated along lines of race and social class on the macro and the micro level, the 6th Ward provides an example to follow.

So where in the City of St. Louis should participatory budgeting go next? What would make most sense to me are those City wards where municipal political participation is most anemic. In such wards, citizens apparently aren't connected and therefore not invested in their City government. Participatory budgeting would foster a powerful social and political opportunity for citizens to get directly connected and therefore invested.

In the March 2013 Democratic primary for Mayor of the City of St. Louis, the mean (average) total raw vote for a City ward was 1573. Below, I express each ward's mayoral raw vote turnout as a percentage of the mean (1573), listing the lowest raw turnout first.

Ward 20: 50%
Ward 25: 61%
Ward 19: 69%
Ward 17: 76%
Ward 22: 76%
Ward 09: 76%
Ward 18: 77%
Ward 11: 82%
Ward 05: 83%
Ward 04: 84%
Ward 14: 86%
Ward 07: 87%
Ward 02: 91%
Ward 03: 94%
Ward 10: 96%
Ward 26: 97%
Ward 24: 98%
Ward 15: 104%
Ward 13: 106%
Ward 01: 107%
Ward 27: 110%
Ward 28: 114%
Ward 08: 116%
Ward 21: 122%
Ward 06: 133%
Ward 23: 137%
Ward 12: 157%
Ward 16: 185%

Of course, some of these wards had down-ballot aldermanic contests while others did not. Still, the mix of even-and-odd-numbered wards at both the top and the bottom of the rankings indicate that attribution of such a down-ballot contest explanation does not suffice. I can't help but see in these rankings that there are wards where citizens are connected and therefore invested in their City government and wards where citizens are not.

Why not do participatory budgeting in the three most anemic turnout wards (20, 25 and 19)? Perhaps connected citizens would translate into invested citizens. Perhaps each of these three wards would surpass 75% of the mean next Mayoral election.

Wednesday, February 12, 2014

The Locally-Preferred Alternative

Good thing that I didn't bet money, because I would have lost. The Take Back St. Louis initiative indeed was enjoined, but on different grounds than what I'd bet that the grounds would be. I'd bet that the threshold issue of whether a citizen initiative to amend the City Charter was allowed by the Missouri Constitution would go against Take Back St. Louis. Well, unbeknownst to me because I didn't do my research, citizen-initiated Charter changes already have been enacted, and nobody at the time ever challenged their constitutionality. The Court wasn't going to overturn a bunch of Charter articles on which everybody's relied for decades as valid. The Court instead invalidated the Take Back St. Louis initiative because, on its face, the initiative would have contravened Missouri TIF statutes. State statutes trump municipal charter articles and ordinances. 

It's too bad that there won't be a Take Back St. Louis vote on April 8, because it would've been fun. It would've been fun, and it would've allowed some good people to develop their electoral campaigning skills. It would've been interesting to see how opponents of the initiative would have campaigned against it. Ah, well.

Anyway ...

On the same day that Take Back St. Louis was swatted-down before there could be a campaign and a vote, PotBoA Lewis Reed and 24th Ward Alderman Scott Ogilvie each soft-launched a campaign to build the "Locally-Preferred Alternative" North-South MetroLink Line. Unlike the "Original" South Line, the "Locally-Preferred Alternative" North-South Line would include a station at Jefferson & CHEROKEE. (Click the pics to embiggen them.)
"Original" South Line


"Locally-Preferred Alternative" North-South
   












On the same day of Reed's and Ogilivie's soft-launches, there was this from Ogilvie with regard to building the "Locally-Preferred Alternative" North-South Line: 
The funny thing is that there already is such a "citizen group." Well, it's a PAC.

It's a PAC called Civic League of Saint Louis. Its mission includes "to organize a constituency for progressive endeavors [and] support and empower visionary candidates." CHEROKEE real estate developer Jason Deem is the PAC's treasurer. It makes sense why both Reed and Ogilvie decided upon the "Locally-Preferred Alternative" North-South Line. The "Locally-Preferred Alternative" line would have a station at CHEROKEE whereas the "Original" would not.

And "visionary candidates" require "support."

Saturday, February 8, 2014

Can the Charter of the City of St. Louis be amended by citizen initiative?

The Charter of the City of St. Louis says "Yes."

Article V, Section 1 of the City Charter:
The people shall have power, at their option to propose ordinances, including ordinances proposing amendments to this charter, and to adopt the same at the polls, with the same effect as if adopted by the board of aldermen and approved by the mayor, such power being known as the initiative.
However, the attorneys representing those opposed to the Take Back St. Louis initiative, which if enacted would amend the City Charter, say "No." They point to an article in the Missouri Constitution that they argue precludes amending the City Charter through citizen initiative.

Article VI, Section 32(a) of the Missouri Constitution:
The charter of the city of St. Louis now existing, or as hereafter amended or revised, may be amended or revised for city or county purposes from time to time by proposals therefor submitted by the lawmaking body of the city to the qualified voters thereof, at a general or special election held at least sixty days after the publication of such proposals, and accepted by three-fifths of the qualified electors voting for or against each of said amendments or revisions so submitted.
So, the anti-Take Back St. Louis attorneys are claiming that the Missouri Constitution allows proposed City Charter amendments to originate only from the Board of Aldermen. They argue, therefore, that a citizen initiative to amend the City Charter violates the Missouri Constitution.

This is a powerful argument, because, in deciding whether to agree or disagree with it, the Bench need not delve into the thicket of conflicting policy claims. The Bench merely needs to decide whether an article of the Missouri Constitution precludes a certain process, namely citizen initiatives to amend the City Charter.

My bet is that if the Bench grants the injunction, it will be on such grounds that, as the anti-Take Back St. Louis attorneys claim, "to the extent Charter, Art. V, §1 allows Charter amendment proposals to arise from the initiative petition process; it conflicts with Mo. Const. Art. VI, §32(a) and is unconstitutional."

Wednesday, January 22, 2014

The Flyswatter Strategy vs. Take Back St. Louis



The expected litigation never materialized, and so the Take Back St. Louis ballot initiative appears set for an April 8 Citywide vote. As I've written before, the initiative has a snowball's chance of 60% approval by City voters. Still, the initiative should be taken seriously by City pols who are opposed to it. Take Back St. Louis has some potential to be troublesome for a Room 200 that enjoys close relationships with Peabody Coal and Laclede Gas. Right now, though, Take Back St. Louis is like a housefly buzzing annoyingly near Room 200's ear. Going at the housefly with a sledgehammer will only draw attention to the issues that Take Back St. Louis aims to raise. The best strategy for Room 200 is to bring sufficient force to soundly defeat Take Back St. Louis, but no more force than what is necessary. A flyswatter will do fine.

The strategic problem to be solved (the swatting of the fly) comes down to solving the problem of April 8 voter turnout. The pro-Take Back St. Louis vote is small, but it's organized and motivated and it most certainly will turn out on April 8. Soundly defeating this pro vote requires an organized and motivated anti vote roughly twice as large as the pro vote. In what quite likely will be a very low-turnout election day, this twice-as-large anti vote won't need to be numerically huge. We're talking a flyswatter strategy here ... not a sledgehammer strategy.

One useful tactic in support of a flyswatter strategy is to try to foster a contested down-ballot aldermanic election in friendly territory on the same day as the April 8 Take Back St. Louis vote. This past December, Mayor Slay announced the appointment of 13th Ward Alderman Fred Wessels as Director of the City's Community Development Administration. Wessels won't officially vacate the 13th Ward Aldermanic seat until February, thereby scheduling the 13th Ward Aldermanic vacancy election on April 8, the same day as the Take Back St. Louis vote. The 13th Ward Democratic Committeewoman, Beth Murphy, is practically certain to get the Democratic nomination from the City's Central Democratic Committee. There is a not insignificant chance that the Republican Central Committee will nominate a candidate for 13th Ward Alderman. An independent or Green could take a shot at it as well.

Of course, this tactic is most successful if the 13th Ward Aldermanic race is actually contested. It would then be a mere matter of generating a list of likely 13th Ward voters in the aldermanic race based on past turnout history, and directly communicating with these likely voters to vote NO on the Take Back St. Louis initiative. If there's a contested aldermanic race in the 13th Ward, then the total votes cast in the 13th Ward could dwarf the total votes of several wards put together. This effect would be somewhat similar to a "reverse coattails" effect.

Another useful tactic in support of a flyswatter strategy is to generate a list of voters with a certain policy affinity that could perceive the Take Back St. Louis initiative as a threat to that policy affinity. The most exploitable and effective policy affinity would be one associated with progressives, because self-described "progressives" constitute the middle between the Take Back St. Louis boosters on the "progressives'" left and the anti-Take Back St. Louis moderate pro-business Democrats on the "progressives'" right. With a list of such "progressive" voters, they can be communicated-with directly to vote NO on Take Back St. Louis in order to protect their policy affinity.

Generating a policy affinity voter list is a different task than is generating a likely voter list. First, you need to identify the policy affinity (ideally associated with voters aligned in the "middle" of the Take Back St. Louis issue) that you can argue will be threatened. Second, you need to identify the voters (ideally aligned in the "middle" of the Take Back St. Louis issue) who share the policy affinity that you can argue is threatened by the initiative. Okay, let's break it down:

First, identify the policy affinity that you can argue will be threatened by the Take Back St. Louis initiative.
Second, identify and generate a list of City voters who share the policy affinity that you can argue is threatened by the Take Back St. Louis initiative.
Voila.

With a list of likely voters in the 13th Ward PLUS a list of motivated STL public transit boosters whom you can scare with claims about Metro's demise should the Take Back St. Louis initiative become law, you have the flyswatter to smash the fly. There's no need for a sledgehammer.